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ABSTRACT: Any attempt to measure the impact of the 9/11 attacks is faced with the 
difficulty of separating the effects of the attacks from the impact of a wider economic 
recession and other simultaneous events. This study attempts to isolate the effect on New 
York office rental and vacancy rates by applying an event study methodology. The results 
support the hypothesis of significant effects of the September 11 attacks in the New York 
office market. These effects seem to be limited, however, in terms of their spatial and 
temporal impact. While the New York office market as a whole has demonstrated remarkable 
resiliency in the wake of the attack, the downtown market and particularly the World Trade 
Center submarket have been affected more clearly. Measured three years after the attack, 
however, cumulative abnormal changes in vacancy rates are moderate in the downtown 




THE SEPTEMBER 11 attack obliterated 13.4 million square feet of office space in the World 
Trade Center (WTC) complex and seriously damaged another 17.7 million square feet in 23 
surrounding buildings, affecting approximately 31.1 million square feet, or 10 percent of the 
total stock of Manhattan office space. Nearly 100,000 office workers were subsequently 
dispersed to over 1,000 different destinations, many of them within Manhattan and a few as 
far away as London and Tokyo. The secondary consequences and potential economic ripple 
effects of the attack on lower Manhattan and New York City as a whole are more difficult to 
grasp than the immediate impact. Over the years since 9/11, it has become evident that 
initial speculation about a mass exodus of office companies from Manhattan has been 
unfounded. There are concerns nevertheless that the long-term effects of 9/11 will pose a   2
continuing threat to lower Manhattan’s economic health. The principal objective of this 
article is to elucidate the impact of the September 11 attack on the New York office market 
by using an event study methodology to analyze market mechanisms in the wake of the 
destruction of the World Trade Center. 
1   THE IMMEDIATE IMPACT OF THE 9/11 ATTACKS ON OFFICE SPACE SUPPLY 
In the aftermath of the September 11 attack, a number of important studies have been 
published, documenting the damage and giving detailed accounts of the whereabouts of 
displaced tenants (see, for example, Kelly 2002). This study presents a reevaluation of the 
impact of 9/11 on the New York office market four years after the recovery process began.
 
Any attempt to measure the impact of 9/11 on the job market, on the stock market, or on 
fiscal revenues is faced with the difficulty of separating the effects of 9/11 from the impact of 
a wider economic recession and other simultaneous events influencing the market. In the case 
of the office market, disentangling and isolating the effects of 9/11 seems easier because of 
certain inherent characteristics of real estate markets. The impact on the supply of office 
space is clearly discernible thanks to available data on the World Trade Center buildings 
themselves and on the damaged buildings that were gradually returned to the market after 
restoration. 
The total amount of office space affected by the 9/11 terrorist attack is estimated at 31.1 
million square feet, of which 13.4 million were completely destroyed and 17.7 million were 
found to be severely damaged (table 1). Destroyed were the seven buildings of the World 
Trade Center, which included the two landmark towers with a total square footage of 4.7 
million square feet of office space each, and five other buildings ranging from 600,000 to 2 
million square feet in size. Also destroyed was the Deutsche Bank building at 130 Liberty 
Street. The building sustained damage that was eventually deemed too extensive to repair in 
an agreement between Deutsche Bank, four insurance carriers, and the Lower Manhattan   3
Development Corporation (LMDC) in which the conclusion was reached to demolish and 
reconstruct the building. 
To put the numbers in perspective, the destroyed space equals roughly the entire office 
stock of the city of Detroit. When the comparison is limited to prime office space, the 
damaged and destroyed space equals the inventory of major office locations such as Atlanta 
and Miami (Jones Lang Lasalle 2001). In the New York City office market, however, because of 
its vast size, the affected space makes up approximately 10 percent of the total inventory of 
New York City, though roughly 60 percent of downtown’s class A space.
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2  DATA AND METHODOLOGY  
The event study approach was first laid out by Eugene Fama and his colleagues (1969) in a 
seminal paper and has since been applied to a wide variety of topics in economics and 
finance, typically with the objective of examining the impact of past occurrences on financial 
markets or particular industries and companies. 
The basic assumption of the event study methodology is that markets are information-efficient 
so that any new information about changes in market conditions will be reflected in changing 
asset prices of the affected industries. The portion of the price change attributable to this 
specific event (for example, the announcement of a merger) is measured as an “abnormal 
return.” In other words, the abnormal return is the difference between the expected future 
price of an asset prior to the event and the observed price including the event. The expected 
price can be derived by estimating the parameters of the statistical relationship between 
Manhattan and the overall national office market with OLS regression.
2 
The datasets necessary to conduct this analysis were obtained from CoStar and Grubb & Ellis 
in quarterly format. The quoted rental rates are weighted averages of asking rents by 
submarkets and/or building. The World Trade Center submarket analyzed in the event study 
comprises a number of restored buildings in the vicinity of the destroyed WTC complex   4
including the World Financial Center and a number of other large office buildings (see figure 1 
for submarket boundaries). 
2.1 Definition of the Event Window 
The first step of an event study is to define an estimation window and an event window. The 
estimation window is a sufficiently long time series of data before the onset of the event 
required to estimate the expected price of the asset. The occurrence of the event itself marks 
the end of the estimation window and the beginning of the event window. The sequence of 
data points that constitute the event window is determined either by a significance measure 
of abnormal changes for a specific event window or simply by the most recent available 
observation. In most event studies, the precise definition of the event window is plagued by 
the fact that information about an impending event— for example, a merger—can become 
available before the actual event, owing to news leaks. However, since the September 11 
attack was a truly unpredictable event, the earliest possible beginning of the event window 
can be determined with great certainty. We therefore define the third quarter of 2001 as the 
first observation (T1) and the fourth quarter of 2003 as the last observation (T2) in the event 
window. The estimation window is specified as the quarterly time series from the first quarter 
of 1990 (T0) through the second quarter of 2001, as shown in figure 2. 
2.2  Estimation of Abnormal Changes and Cumulative Abnormal Changes 
There are several ways to estimate the expected and abnormal changes of an asset (see 
MacKinlay 1997). To test the impact of the September 11 attack on the New York office 
market, we adopt here the market model approach because it is more accurate than a long-
run mean measure or approaches based on assumed identical change rates in submarkets and 
aggregated markets. The expected return or change rate is expressed as: 
   5
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where Rit is the total return of asset i in period t, αi is the baseline return of the asset in 
question, βi is the coefficient for asset i in relation to Rmt, the overall market return, and εit 
is white noise, which is assumed to have a constant mean of zero and zero covariance. 
Conditional on the standard assumptions of OLS regression models, αi and βi are efficient 
estimators. In the context of this research, the market return rate Rit is proxied by the rental 
or vacancy rate of the Manhattan market or other submarkets, and Rmt is the corresponding 
rental or vacancy change rate of the overall U.S. office market. The abnormal change rate Ait 
is thus defined as: 
 
mt i i it it R R A β α ˆ ˆ − − =       (2) 
 
The abnormal change rate is the difference between the actual observed ex post return minus 
the expected return, as calculated in equation 1 with estimation window data.
3 In the present 
study, the abnormal change due to the 9/11 attack can be calculated through out-of-sample 
forecasting of the market model for all the periods constituting the event window (whose 
limits are denoted by T1 and T2-n ). Assuming efficient markets, the null hypothesis is 
consequently: 
 
() 0 . , . 2 1 0 = = n T T CA H       (3) 
 
If the 9/11 attack has generated no abnormal changes over the defined event window, the 
mean abnormal change rate and the cumulative abnormal change rate should be   6
insignificantly different from zero. To test this hypothesis we define the average abnormal 
return as: 
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The total estimated impact or cumulative abnormal change over the defined period is 
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where τn are the time units (quarters) in the event window that are summed up to yield the 
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If Z is significantly greater than zero, we reject the null hypothesis that the 9/11 attack had 
no significant effect on rents and vacancies in favor of the alternative hypothesis that the 
attack did have a significant impact. Since both A and CA are assumed to follow a normal 
distribution with zero mean and constant variance, the critical absolute test value for Z is 
1.96 (for p < .05). If the absolute value of Z exceeds 2.58, the difference is also significant at 
the p < .01 level. 
The measurement of abnormal changes in event studies is typically based on monetary units. 
In the case of the office market, however, using data on asking rents in the office market may 
not give an entirely accurate representation of the temporal reaction to the 9/11 effect, since 
asking rents are known to be “sticky” and do not adjust to new information with the same 
speed as, for example, stock prices. Therefore, we also examine vacancy levels (including 
sublet), which respond to market shocks with shorter delays. 
It might be argued that the U.S. office market data utilized to estimate the expected values 
for the New York market were also subject to effects from the September 11 attack, thus 
introducing a possible bias into the estimators that could lead to underestimating the true 
impact of 9/11 on the New York office market. Although the overall direct impact of the 
attack on the aggregated U.S. market was considerably lower than its impact on the New York 
market, it is nevertheless important to keep in mind that any effects and abnormal changes 
reported here are specific local effects and in excess of the broader and indirect 9/11 impact 
on the U.S. market. 
2.3  Empirical Results 
The results of the analysis for the event window (T1,T2.1) are reported in table 2. The 
average abnormal changes (A¯ ) and the cumulative abnormal changes (CA) demonstrate clear 
differences among the analyzed areas in the calculated impact of the 9/11 attack. As 
indicated by the R square and F statistics, significance values of the regressions decrease   8
generally with the size of the geographic unit, giving rise to the assumption that smaller areas 
are more prone to idiosyncratic behavior over time than larger, aggregated markets. In the 
case of the World Trade Center submarket (which also comprises the World Financial Center 
and a number of other office buildings in the area), the regression is not significant at the 5 
percent level, and therefore the reported abnormal changes have to be interpreted with 
caution.  
In general, all the reported abnormal changes show the expected sign, a lower than predicted 
rent level and a higher than predicted vacancy rate. An intuitive assumption would be that the 
downtown and especially the World Trade Center submarkets exhibit higher abnormal changes 
than midtown or the overall Manhattan market. This is not unequivocally confirmed, however, 
by the results for the defined event window. Regarding rental values, the downtown market 
was indeed more strongly affected by the attack and is the only market where the null 
hypothesis of a nonsignificant impact can be rejected. In terms of vacancy rates, the opposite 
is the case. All markets exhibit a significant impact except downtown. Since the relationship 
between rents and vacancy rates is marked by significant lags, it seems advisable to inspect 
the quarterly changes after September 11, 2001, for both variables in more detail before 
redefining the event window.  
Table 3 shows the quarterly abnormal changes for vacancy rates in the four examined areas. 
As expected, the initial impact in the third quarter of 2001 is highest in the downtown and 
WTC submarkets. The abnormal change data suggests, however, that the pattern was reversed 
about one year after the attack when changes in the vacancy rate exhibited a more positive 
pattern than expected, which continued throughout the period. The reason for the 
unexpectedly positive developments downtown might be the effect of the massive subsidies 
and revitalization efforts of multiple levels of government. An alternative explanation would 
be that this is simply a mean reversion effect, a counter movement to the jump in vacancy 
rates in the wake of September 11, 2001. The assumption underlying such an explanation is   9
that markets tend to return to long-run equilibrium prices after a one-time, non-persisting 
shock event. 
The rent data reported in table 4 seem to support this argument. While rents fell precipitously 
in the downtown and WTC submarkets in the first quarter following the September 11 attack 
(see figure 3), these submarkets achieved higher than predicted positive change rates as 
conditions in lower Manhattan gradually improved and buildings and critical infrastructure 
links were restored. This phenomenon is especially pronounced in the WTC market in the 
fourth quarter of 2001, when rental rates trended up toward previous levels as a result of the 
efforts to clean up the area and restore damaged buildings. The effect, however, dissipated in 
the medium run, hinting at a possible structural problem in the World Trade Center submarket 
that may not be completely remedied until the area has been fully rebuilt as a major office 
cluster and transportation hub. 
To test the null hypothesis of insignificant cumulative abnormal changes from the September 
11 attack for a shorter period, we redefine the event window. Table 5 shows the results for 
the event window ranging from the third quarter of 2001 through the third quarter of 2002 
(T1,T2.2 in figure 2). This time we find a more consistent pattern in the combination of rental 
and vacancy rates. Based on the statistical evidence for this event window, we reject the null 
hypothesis for the overall Manhattan and midtown markets but find a significant impact on the 
downtown market. The World Trade Center submarket exhibits highly significant results in 
terms of vacancies, but these results are not significant in terms of rents; this may be due to 
attempts by landlords to restore the previous levels of asking rents soon after 9/11 when in 
fact market conditions as reflected by vacancy rates were less favorable. 
In summary, we find evidence of significant effects of the September 11 attack in the New 
York office market. These effects seem to be limited, however, in terms of their spatial and 
temporal impact. While the Manhattan office market as a whole has demonstrated remarkable   10
resiliency in the wake of the attack (measured in reported rents and vacancy rates), the 
downtown market and particularly the World Trade Center submarket have been affected 
more clearly. Therefore, it is not surprising that rent levels are lower than expected and 
vacancy levels are higher than expected in these markets when compared to estimates 
derived from historic time-series data. Measured two years after the attack, however, 
cumulative abnormal changes in vacancy rates are moderate in the downtown submarket, 
indicating a much weaker medium-term impact of the attack than expected in its aftermath. 
 
3 DISSAGGREATION BY BUILDING HEIGHT 
The 9/11 attacks had an unequal impact on various spatial submarkets, as the preceding 
section demonstrates. Apart from the impact on spatial submarkets, a further assumption to 
be investigated is that tenants would shun prominent skyscrapers in response to the 9/11 
attack. The susceptibility of famous buildings and very tall buildings to terrorist attacks in the 
future might lead tenants in search of office space to move to low-height and “lowprofile” 
buildings instead of the most prestigious and conspicuous buildings, which were favored 
locations before 9/11. Norman Miller and his colleagues (2003), along with Torto Wheaton 
Research (2002), postulate, however, that these so-called trophy buildings are still coveted by 
both tenants and investors and that there is no flight from tall buildings due to psychological 
reasons and fear of new attacks. By analyzing a set of seven high-profile trophy buildings, 
Torto Wheaton Research shows that these buildings exhibited below-average vacancy rates 
one year after the attack. Miller et al. (2003) envision, however, that adverse affects will 
harm the marketability of a few truly famous office buildings, such as the Empire State 
Building. 
To test this assumption, it is important to distinguish between “trophy” buildings and “tall” 
buildings (despite a large overlap of the two categories). There are several buildings in   11
Manhattan that are considered trophy, or “toptier,” but not all of these buildings are in the 
group of the thirty or even fifty tallest buildings in Manhattan. Conversely, not all of the thirty 
tallest office buildings in Manhattan are considered trophy. As far as a discounting of market 
values for fear of future terrorist attacks is concerned, it is simply the height of an office 
building that evokes concerns about being the target of another terrorist attack rather than 
the rating of a building by brokerage professionals or any measures of value and rental 
income. Figure 4 compares the vacancy rates of two sets of buildings (forty or more stories 
and fifty or more stories) extracted from the CoStar (2001) building database. (Samples are 
weighted by rentable building area.) The vacancy rate, which is a leading indicator and thus 
more appropriate to reveal trends than rental rates, shows that the tallest buildings (fifty or 
more stories) in particular recorded a sharp hike in vacancies after 9/11. Despite the fact that 
vacancy rates declined and approached the values of the average market in the following 
quarters, they still remain above market average and significantly above rates for buildings 
forty or more stories high. The difference becomes even more pronounced when fifty-story-or-
higher buildings are eliminated from the forty-story-plus subset of buildings. The category of 
buildings between forty and forty-nine stories high shows significantly lower vacancies for 
these buildings. In general, it is evident that the expected flight of tenants from tall office 
buildings did not occur in the first three years following the attack. The data point to a 
potential problem for the tallest office buildings (fifty stories or higher), at least in the first 
three years following the attack. This might be attributed to a psychological effect among 
office tenants perceiving some of the tallest structures in the city as potential targets of 
terrorist attacks and seeking to avoid them, but the  impact of this effect on overall vacancy 
in the affected buildings appears to be small and is likely to dissipate barring another incident 
involving tall office buildings. 
Moreover, analyzing a list of displaced tenants (Grubb & Ellis, 2002) shows that most tenants 
in the database moved to buildings with more than twenty, but fewer than forty stories. A   12
smaller percentage moved to buildings with forty to forty-nine stories, and a few large tenants 
decided to move to buildings with fifty or more stories. Overall, only a small share of the 
displaced tenants contained in the subsample moved to buildings with fewer than twenty 
stories. These findings underline the conclusion that there is no clear evidence of an aversion 
effect for either tenants in general or the group that was immediately affected by the attack.  
 
4  CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK 
More than three years after 9/11, there is scant evidence that the attack will have a long-
lasting impact on the Manhattan office market. Particularly in the submarkets of midtown 
Manhattan, no significant impact could be detected beyond the market adjustment process 
that took place in the two quarters following 9/11. Lower Manhattan, however, was more 
deeply affected by the attack and its various consequences.  
The Manhattan office market as a whole does not show any signs of lasting economic damage. 
Of the companies that decided not to return to lower Manhattan after 9/11, the majority 
relocated to midtown Manhattan. An industry analysis demonstrated that both urbanization 
and localization economies were at play in the relocation process and that companies 
preferred to settle in preexisting large industry clusters in Manhattan. Taken together, the 
core markets of midtown and downtown Manhattan captured about 80 percent of the stream 
of displaced tenants after 9/11, while areas outside of these two core clusters captured only 
20 percent, which bodes well for Manhattan’s ability to remain a prime office location even in 
the face of a severe crisis. 
To be sure, a more decentralized development of office space and a more dynamic increase in 
office workers in the wider CMSA region outside of Manhattan— processes that have been 
evolving for at least two decades—are likely to continue over the next years. Although security 
concerns are likely to accelerate this development at least temporarily as firms seek to create   13
backup facilities and distribute key functions across various locations to protect their 
operations, preliminary analysis of the period after 9/11 shows that agglomeration economies 
and firm efficiency criteria are restraining and mitigating such dispersion tendencies in 
Manhattan. Moreover, Manhattan has clearly been able to retain a competitive productivity 
advantage in the office-using industries. In fact, Manhattan’s productivity differential in the 
office-using industries over both the national and the regional average has continued to 
increase even since 9/11. 
Three years after the attack, lower Manhattan has demonstrated considerable progress in 
overcoming this crisis both physically and economically. A total of 31.1 million square feet of 
office space were affected in lower Manhattan, of which 14.8 million were destroyed and 19.6 
million damaged and eventually restored. The affected space makes up less than 10 percent 
of the total inventory of New York City but accounts for roughly 60 percent of downtown’s 
class A space. The sudden loss of more than 100,000 jobs and a large portion of its office 
inventory sent lower Manhattan, which had been struggling for much of the last three 
decades, into a severe economic crisis.  
However, the majority of businesses directly affected by the attack have opted to remain in 
the downtown area or have returned there after the damaged buildings were restored. The 
rebuilding process is well under way, and the first office tower to be rebuilt on the World 
Trade Center site, Building 7, with 52 stories and 1.7 million square feet of office space, is 
expected to open in early 2006. Rental rates and building vacancies seem to have stabilized 
after the lower Manhattan market weakened dramatically in the quarters following 9/11. 
Despite the progress made to date, the lower Manhattan office market faces some serious 
challenges for the next few years. Office employment in the area is considerably lower than it 
was before the 9/11 attack, and it remains to be seen whether the losses can be fully 
recovered before the completion of the rebuilding process around 2015. Considering that the   14
area has traditionally been more volatile owing to the dominance of finance and technology 
industries, a full recovery is possible once these key sectors demonstrate sustained job growth 
again. In the long run, however, it is critical that lower Manhattan diversify its economy and 
attract a broader cross-section of office-using industries to the area. 
Both the exploratory data analysis and the event analysis demonstrate that markets reacted 
efficiently and predictably to the 9/11 attack. Among the most notable phenomena are the 
downward corrections in occupied space across Manhattan when displaced tenants had the 
choice of leasing new space after 9/11. On the aggregate, companies rented about 15 percent 
less space than they had occupied in the affected buildings. Space reduction was particularly 
pronounced in high-priced buildings and submarkets, such as Park Avenue and Grand Central. 
Moreover, the set of so-called trophy buildings proved to be less affected by the recession 
than the general market, a finding that runs counter to initial assumptions about the future of 
office high-rises. Only the tallest buildings in the city (fifty or more stories) exhibited slightly 
higher vacancies after 9/11, arguably because of an aversion to the very tallest and most 
famous structures in the city as potential targets of further terrorist attacks. 
In addition to a drastic reduction in leased space, the accommodation of displaced tenants 
within the existing office space portfolio of large companies contributed further to lower 
occupancy rates than had been expected after the destruction of 10 percent of the inventory. 
This phenomenon, also known as backfill, caused overall absorption to be negative in the 
quarters following 9/11, since the positive demand created by displaced tenants was more 
than offset by losses incurred in the accelerated recession. Positive absorption of 
approximately 7 million square feet of office space in various submarkets of Manhattan can be 
attributed to tenants who were displaced by the 9/11 attack. This figure is much lower than 
expected given the square footage of the destroyed buildings. Approximately half of the 
anticipated demand dissipated through backfill into existing space, reduced staff, subleasing, 
and more economical space usage per office worker.   15
The full impact of the September 11 attack is still unknown after more than three years. The 
rent implications of 9/11-related factors such as increased security and insurance costs as well 
as government subsidies to New York City are not entirely clear at this point. Moreover, the 
recovery trajectory of the lower Manhattan market needs to be explored in detail with an 
econometric model, which could take into account a number of factors that influence supply 
and demand. Further research is required to answer these questions as longer time series of 
data become available to separate short-term adjustment processes from long-term impacts.  
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1 Figures for the total inventory of office space differ widely among providers of market data because of diverging 
definitions of geographic areas and types of buildings. Total inventory figures used in this study are based on the 
definitions and data provided by Grubb & Ellis (2001) 
2 Since the number of independently estimated cross-sectional data is very limited in contrast to firm-level event 
studies, no further measures regarding cross-sectional heteroskedasticity and covariability are taken here. 
3 James M. Patell (1976) suggests that the values obtained for the event window period have to be adjusted because 
they are bound to have a higher variance than the residuals of the estimation window. For the purpose of the present 
study, the values of abnormal returns are not standardized, since this does not change the results significantly (see 
Brown and Warner 1985). 
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